

THE LESSON OF A VICTORY

We salute the British victory for the Schneider trophy contest with the most loyal open heartedness and with the most sincere recognition of a neat superiority beyond argument.

The much expected British-Italian duel never took place for our planes, one after the other, were eliminated from the contest, and even the hard battle fought by the dauntless Guazzetti, never for a single moment, troubled the galliant British team.

Three weeks before the contest, we wrote, on number 6 of « *Aeronautica* »: The average speed claimed by the British, even if accepted with ample reserve, is so bewildered that we have to judge it as absolutely unattainable by our planes. Other factors are to be weighted excluding, from the point of view of the success, the minimum average speed that may we have reached, these other factors are: the general airworthness of the planes, the reliability of the engines and the skill of the pilots ».

We, for an excessive spirit of Italianity, preferred to nurse our hopes in sweet dreams, but it was impossible to missjudge beforehand that the British planes were superior to ours regarding the factor speed. We relayed not only on our pilots skill but also on the reliability of our engines.

During the training period at Varese, we hoped for better chances, but, when te news of the colossal speed attained by the British pilots reached us, we did not esitate to declare that such speed was absolutely unattainable with our machines. Even if De-Bernardi and Ferrarin should have completed the whole course, the average speed of the Macchis would have been of 430-435 km. p. h. against the 453-439 km. p. h. of the two Supermarines and the 438 km. p. h. of the Gloster.

The supremacy of the British team never would have been in danger even if our planes might have completed the whole race.

We must seize the opportunity of this hard lesson we learned to draw usefull knoveledges for the future.

Very wisely England did not compete last year, not being well prepared, hence she had more time to have their planes and engines in full readiness for this year contest.

The very substantial facts are that Great Britain presented herself at Venice with three different types of planes, that is to say, the most perfect machines that the Supermarine, the Gloster and the Bristol firms can build. The Bristol Crusader having crashed, another Supermarine took his place.

As for the Engines, a-part the eliminated Bristol, the three Napier left in the contest, had different characteristics, one being of a direct drive type, the other geared and the third one with a special reduction gear giving much bigger difference between the airscrew speed and the engine speed than is given in the standard engine.

This method proved very successfull; of the three egines, two accomplished the whole course, and the third one was forced down after having flown for nearly 300 km.

Our team was too uniform, three equal planes and three similiar engines, thence once our inferiority has been demonstrated, the chances of success completely vanished even if our planes may have been ables to complete the race.

The average speed obtained would have been of only 430 km. p. h.

Two of our engines were forced down just after a few kilometers and the other, for the six round completed, reached an average speed of only 414 km. p. h.

In this case the problem of the engine prevail. In fact it seems to be more logical to build a plane round the engine than to create an aerodinamically perfect plane and then install the engine on it.

As for the engines, it is not use to try to get extra power by pushing up the compression and increasing the revolution without doing enough reserches and experiments to discover how to get the working parts to stand up to the increased stresses.

We must look forward to the engine problem with more interest and, if possible, not rely upon one particular type only; or, if we are compelled to attain ourselves to one particular scheme, well study the details and different particulars so to rely on the assumption that it, at any rate, would be reliable enough to complete the whole course at the required speed.

Once the engines are ready, lets two or three firms to build an appropriate plane for them.

Unhappily all this cant be done suddently and, after the hard lesson learned at Venice, we assume that the period of 12 months is not sufficient for us to get ready for the next year contest and to compete with chances against the British and, perphas, the American machines.

We shall be justified for not being at the starting point in the 1928 Schneider competition if, before that period, we shall not be able to produce such a machine to reach, on our shores, an average speed of 470 km. p. h.

Perphas it seems to be asking too much, but in this case we esteem much better not to worry over the 1928 contest and do our best to be in perfect readiness for the 1929 race.

Clearly enough Great Britain, being absent for one year, shoved us how to win.

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